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This paper discusses how private pension programs differ from public social security in their
likely impact on aggregate saving. Although private pensions are likely to reduce direct saving
by employees, this should be offset by the combination of companies' partial funding and the
shareholders response to unfunded liabilities. In contrast to several earlier empirical studies that
implied that social security does depress national saving, the current time series evidence
suggests that the growth of private pensions has not had an adverse effect on saving and may
have increased saving by a small amount.
1. Introduction
Private pensions are now an important source of retirement income in the
United States and a significant instrument of government policy. In 1974,
some 30 million private employees were covered under some form of private
pension plan. In that year, private plans paid some $12.9 billion in benefits
to 6.4 million retirees and their dependents.1
The development of private pensions has been stimulated by favorable tax
treatment. The pension contributions made by an employer are a deductible
business expense but are not regarded as taxable income to employees until
benefits are paid out. The earnings of the pension fund are also allowed to
accumulate without the payment of any income tax. When pension benefits
are paid out to retirees, the recipients' incomes are generally low so that the
tax rates are lower than they were when the wage income was originally
earned. In adlition, a special retirement income credit further reduces the
effective tax rates on private pension benefits. The U.S. Treasury has
estimated that the effect of excluding pension contributions and earnings
from individuals' taxable income reduced personal tax collection by $5.7
billion in fiscal year 1975.2 Since the social security payroll tax (currently at
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therate of 1.1.7percent)isalso not levied on either pension contributions or
benefits, even the $5.7 billion understates the magnitude of the subsidy.
One of the central issues in evaluating any public or private pension
program is the impact of the program on aggregate saving. Private peiision
plansin the United States now play a major role in the structure of national
saving. The accumulated reserves of the private pensions reached $192 billion
at the end of '1974, the latest year for which data is available.3 The annual
growth of these private pension reserves has averaged 25percentof personal
saving during the decade ending in 1974. The net impact of these private
pensions on aggregate saving has received surprisingly little attention.4 The
purpose of this paper is to analyze the ways in which private pensions may
affect total saving and to present some econometric evidence on the relation
between pension saving and total personal saving.5
Section 2 introduces the notion of the employees' subjective 'total asset
accumulation,' defined as 'the, sum of their direct personal saving plus the
increase in the value of their prospective pension benefits. Five reasons why
the provision of -private pensions may increase their 'total asset accumu-
lation' are analyzed. It is often incorrectly assumed that an increase in
employees' 'total asset accumulation' implies an increase in aggregate private
saving. Section 3 discusses why an increase in employees' 'total asset
accumulation' need not increase and may actually have decreased real
private saving. The basic reason for this is that much of the increase in the
value of prospective benefits is not funded at the time that it is created. The
growth of private pensions could therefore induce employees to reduce their
direct nonpension savings by more than the amount by which companies
and their shareholders increase their saving. The shareholders' limited
perception of their companies' additional future pension liabilities is crucial
to this explanation. To assess the net effect of pension growth on private
saving, section 4 presents econometric evidence based on U.S. aggregate time
series data.
2. The effect of pensions on employees' total asset accumulation
Although popular discussions often assume that the annual growth in the
value of pension funds represents an equivalent increase in national saving,
standard economic analysis suggests that the growth of pensions is essentially
3See Skolnik (1976).
4The effect of pensions on the savings of covered workers has been studied empirically by
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private saving remains largely unexplored.
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achange in the formofsaving rather than an increase in the total amount.
When individuals receive part of their compensation in the form of promised
retirement income, they can reduce their other saving by a corresponding
amount. More explicitly, if the switch of compensation from wage income to
future pension benefits leaves a worker's lifetime budget constraint un-
changed, the rational and unconstrained individual does not alter his lifetime
consumption plan; direct personal saving is therefore reduced by the present
value of the future benefit. This standard view is clearly implicit in all
econometric work on personal savings which ignores the growth of pen-
sions.6 It is also explicit in the conventional model of the rational response
to pension saving that is discussed by Cagan (1965), Munnell (1974), and
others.
A closer examination does however suggest five reasons why the tax-
induced growth of private pensions may cause employees to change their
'total asset accumulation,' i.e. the sum of their direct saving and the present
actuarial value of their pension benefits. Since an increase in such 'total asset
accumulation' is a necessary condition for pensions to increase national
saving, it is important to consider each of these five reasons. The analysis
shows that the effect of private pensions on employees' total asset accumu-
lation is actually ambiguous; direct saving could actually decrease by more
than the value of pension benefits.
2.1. The rate of return on saving -
Thefavorable tax treatment of pension contributions and pension fund
income raises the net rate of return that is available to workers. Since the tax
revenue that is lost by this increase in the net rate of return must be raised
by increasing other taxes or reducing government spending, the increase in
the net rate of return that follows from the tax treatment of pensions can be
regarded as a compensated increase. Although it is natural to assume that
such a compensated increase in the rate of return causes an increase in
desired saving, there are two problems with such an inference.
First, the increased rate of return may apply only to intramarginal saving.
Each individual is not free to vary his own pension contribution. If the
pension benefit of an individual represents less saving than he would
otherwise do, the higher rate of return has no effect on his incentive to save.
To the extent therefore that a firm's pension benefits are set at a level that
can serve as a 'widely accepted minimum' that individuals are expected to
supplement by direct saving, the favorable tax treatment is merely a reward
for saving that would have occurred anyway.
bThe national income statistics include the pension contributions of employers and employees
in personal saving and personal income. Thus pension contributions are regarded as a form of
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Second,even when the opportunity for pension saving can be regarded as
raising the marginal rate of return available to the individual, the result need
not be an increase in saving.7 A compensated increase in the rate of return is
equivalent to a compensated decrease in the price of future consumption and,
as such, can be expected to increase future consumption. But current saving
is the expenditure on future consumption and will only increase if the
compensated price elasticity of retirement consumption exceeds one. The
effect of the net rate of interest on private saving is thus theoretically
indeterminate. Stated somewhat differently, when the pension saving option
is effective at the margin, it converts the current income tax to a
consumption tax. This raises the current tax on wage and salary income and
reduces the future tax on interest and other capital income. Shifting tax
liabilities from the future to the present tends to reduce current saving. A
compensated increase in the net rate of return that takes this forii can raise
future consumption and lower future taxes while raising current taxes enough
to reduce both current consumption and current saving. This is possible but
not necessary; it does however show why an increase in the marginal net
rate of return may actually decrease private saving.8
It is clear moreover that the substitution of current taxes for future taxes
will have an unambiguously adverse effect on private saving if the pension
option changes only the intramarginal rate of return. With no change in the
rate of return, a compensated change in taxes leaves consumption in each
period unchanged.9 The increase in current taxes therefore requires a
decrease in current saving; the resulting decrease in future income is just
equal to the reduction in the future tax liability.
In short, the higher after-tax rate of return made possible by the favorable
tax treatment of pension saving may stimulate more total asset accumulation
but economic theory does not imply that this is necessarily true or even that
it is more likely than the alternative.
2.2. Pensions as annuities
A common feature of pension programs is that benefits are provided in the
form of an annuity when the participant reaches a prescribed retirement age.
Because of the advantages of group purchase and of commitments made a
long time before retirement, the pension plans are able to provide annuities
on more favorable terms that individuals could buy themselves. The growth
of pensions has therefore brought with it an increased use of annuities to
The argument of this paragraph is developed more fully in Feldstein (1977b).
8Boskin (1977) presents evidence that aggregate private saving does respond positively to
higher net rates of return; there are however significant problems of measuring the relevant net
rate of return and no attention is given to the growth of private or public pensions.
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finance retirement consumption. This substitution of annuities for con-
ventional retirement dissaving can be expected to alter employees' total asset
accumulation but the direction of the change is unclear.
Because the annuity permits the individual to 'use' all of his assets for his
own consumption,'° the annuity in effect raises the return that the individual
obtains for himself on his assets. This is an uncompensated change and
therefore, given a positive marginal propensity to save, tends to raise his
saving.11 But the annuity also eliminates the financial risk associated with
living to an old age and this tends to reduce the amount of asset
accumulation that the individual will want to do during his preretirement
years.
Although it would be useful to examine the interaction of these effects with
an explicit model, it seems clear that the net effect of introducing annuities is
theoretically indeterminate.
2.3. Induced retirement
Pension benefits are generally paid only when a worker retires from his
regular job. Although the benefits may also be available if the 'retiree' starts
work with a new employer, most workers who leave their regular jobs in
order to collect pensions do not start new full-time employment. The wage
rates that are available to older workers in such alternative employment are
often substantially lower than their previous wage bccause the individual
loses job specific skills, seniority rewards, etc. The availability of pensions
that are contingent on retirement can therefore be viewed as generally
inducing earlier retirement than would otherwise occur.
Earlier planned retirement should make employees want to accumulate
assets (including direct savings and pension benefits) at a faster rate for two
related reasons. First, individuals who plan to have a longer retirement
period will want to accumulate more assets by the time they retire. Second.
with a shorter preretirement period within which to accumulate, total saving
per year must be higher to accumulate any given level of assets by the time
of retirement. While the earlier retirement also implies that the number of
dissaving years will increase relative to the number of saving years, in a
growing economy the first two effects will dominate and aggregate saving
will rise.'2
The positive effect of induced retirement on individual asset accumulation
will be reduced or reversed to the extent that individuals do not properly
anticipate this induced early retirement. To understand this, consider the
101nan cx ante actuarial sense: that is, the individual need have no unplanned bequest.
it is more likely to than a compensated change but, for the reasons given above, need not.
'2For a more complete discussion of induced retirement and saving in the extended life cycle
model, see Feldstein (I 976a).282 M.Feldstein. Prii ate pensions
extreme case in which an individual plans to retire at age 70 and does no'
alter his plans when a pension program is introduced at the firm where h
works. He reduces his direct personal saving in such a way that his tota
asset accumulation (i.e. his direct saving plus the increase in the value of hit
pension rights) remains unchanged. However, when he reaches age 65 h
decides to accept the pension and retire. In this admittedly extreme case, th
unanticipated induced retirement converts the years between ages 65 and 7(
from a period of asset accumulation to a period of dissaving. If everyorn
behaved in this way, induced earlier retirement would reduce aggregat
saving. More generally, the effect on saving of induced early retiremen
depends on the extent to which the change in retirement is correctl3
anticipated by individuals and taken into account in their saving decisions.
2.4. Forced saving
Private pensions may force individuals to accumulate more assets thai
they would otherwise choose to do. This is particularly likely for worker:
with relatively low earnings for whom the public social security progran
already provides benefits that are quite high relative to previous earnings
For example, a worker who has had the median level of earnings throughou
his working life and who retires at age 65 with a dependent wife will nov
receive social security benefits equal to 65 percent of his highest year'
earnings.13 These social security benefits are indexed to keep pace witl
inflation. Moreover, since the benefits are untaxed, they replace nearly 8
percent of lost net income. The replacement rate is even higher for workert
with lower earnings. The Medicare program also provides heavily subsidizec
health insurance for everyone over age 65. With such a relatively high leve
of public retirement benefits, many individuals may have little desire foi
additional private retirement saving. Since these individuals would generall
find it impossible to borrow against future pension benefits, they are forcec
to accumulate more for retirement than they would otherwise prefer.
Although this picture of 'forced saving' is undoubtedly correct for som
individuals, it is not clear how important this effect is in the aggregate. Th
level of private pension benefits is not imposed by the government or se
arbitrarily but is chosen by the firm or union in response to what th
covered workers prefer. The level of benefits varies not only among firms bu
also within firms among groups with different levels of earnings. The tax law:
that govern pension contributions explicitly permit firms to take socia
security into account in setting the pension benefits at each earnings level
Although individual preferences at each earnings level are not uniform, thos
'3See the Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the Congressional Researc
Service, 1976.M. Feldstezn, Priiatt pe?ision. 283
whoset the pension levels recognize that it is often easier for individuals to
supplement pensions by direct saving than to offset pension by dissaving.
The difficulty of offsetting pension accumulation should also not be
exaggerated. Individuals often have other savings that can be reduced. In
particular, homeowners accumulate equity as house values rise and mort-
gages are reduced. This form of saving can be reduced by remortgaging a
house or, as is not uncommon, by moving into smaller quarters before
retirement and using some of the sale proceeds to finance consumption.
2.5. Unintended saving and incorrect perception
All of the preceding arguments have been based on the assumption of
rational life-cycle saving by individuals who correctly anticipate the size of
their pension benefits. It is frequently argued that this is an inappropriate
description of household behavior, that saving is based on habit and rule of
thumb rather than rational planning, and that pensions therefore increase
employees' total asset accumulation without any explicit decision by the
covered individuals. Since individuals are very badly informed about the
future benefits to which they will be entitled, the argument continues, they
are likely to ignore or undervalue these benefits and therefore to end up
accumulating more assets (including the value of pension benefits) than they
had intended.
Like 'forced saving,' the notion of unintended saving is a correct picture
for some individuals but of unknown aggregate importance. Even individuals
who appear to decide their saving by arbitrary rules of thumb may adjust
those rules in response to pension programs. Although household surveys
show that individuals do not know the money value of the future pensions,'4
this emphasis on specific money values is misplaced. Individuals may have a
better idea of how pensions will relate to preretirement income or of how
much additional retirement income will be required to achieve their desired
standard of living; unfortunately, we have no evidence on theseperceptions.
Moreover, an incorrect perception of prospective pension benefits should not
be equated with an underestimate. Individuals may exaggerate the likely size
of their future benefits, ignore the limits on vesting and portability, or belittle
the probability of reducing or losing benefits by changing jobs.
2.6. Microeconomic evidence
I began this section by noting that the basic theory of rational saving
behavior suggests that employees would respond to an increase in private
pension benefits by reducing other direct saving by an actuarially equal
'4Seee.g. Katona (1965). This study and other household survey evidence onpensions and
saving isdiscussed below.284 Al. Frfi/cieiii. l'rii (U c pcn. inn
amount.The section then discussed five reasons why this one-for-one
substitution may not be correct, i.e. why private pensions may change the
total asset accumulation of covered employees. Only one of these, the 'forced
saving' that occurs when individuals cannot borrow to offset what they
regard as excessive pension benefits, has an unambiguous effect on total asset
accumulation. Each of the other considerations implies that the growth of
private pensions may either increase or decrease the total asset accumulation
of the covered employees.
The attempts to resolve this uncertainty by econometric research have
unfortunately been severely hampered by the lack of microeconometric data
on the pension benefits to which employees are entitled. Empirical studies
have been forced to focus on the differences in direct saving between
employees who are covered by private pension programs of any size and
those who are not covered. The early work of Cagan (1965) and Katona
(1965) concluded that covered employees do not reduce their direct saving.
In a more recent study using longitudinal panel data, Munnell (1976) found
that male employees over age 45 reduce their direct saving markedly when
they have private pensions although not by as much as the value of their
pension benefits. The econometric evidence is thus subject to unusually great
uncertainty.
It seems reasonable to believe at this time, on the basis of the theoretical
analysis and the available evidence, that private pensions increase the total
asset accumulation of the covered employees but by less than the full
actuarial value of the pensions.
3. Unfunded pensions, shareholder myopia and national saving
An increase in the total asset accumulation of covered employees is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the growth of private pensions to
raise national saving. The net effect of pensions on national saving depends
critically on the response of the companies and their shareholders. This
section explains how pensions can raise the 'total asset accumulation' of
employees while lowering aggregate private saving.
It is useful to begin with a special case in which aggregate saving remains
unchanged. The effect on saving of departing from these special benchmark
assumptions can then be examined. In particular, the three assumptions of
this special case are:iS
(1) Correctemployeeperception. Employees regard the annual increase in
the present actuarial value of their future pensions as an equivalent
increase in their wealth, i.e. as a component of their 'total asset
iscasest to analyze this case if we disregard the effects of taxes. This simplifies exposition
without changing the basic conclusions of the more general case.t eat. I'sn atepen\ion.s 285
accumulation.'Their current wages are therefore reduced below what
they would otherwise be by an equal amount.
(2)Constantemployees' total asset accumulation. Employees reduce their
direct personal saving to keep the sum of this direct saving and the
increased value of future pension benefits unchanged.
(3) Fullfunding. Thecompany maintains a pension fund with assets equal
to the present actuarial value of its employees' anticipated pension
benefits. The annual contribution to this fund is financed by the
reduction in the firm's total wages since, by assumption 1, the reduced
wages are just equal to the actuarial value of the newly created benefits.
It is easy to see that these three assumptions imply that the introduction
of a private pension has no effect on national saving. The employees keep
their 'total asset accumulation' unchanged and therefore reduce their direct
saving by the increased value of their pensions. At the same time firms
increase their direct saving by the same amount. With full funding, the
reduced saving of employees is just sufficient to finance the firms' pension
fund saving. Shareholders are indifferent since there is no change in the
current or future cost of employee compensation and therefore no change in
profits. National saving remains completely unchanged.
In practice, firms do not fully fund their expected future pension benefit
payments. Although aggregate data on unfunded future expected benefits are
not currently available, the amount is likely to be quite large; some examples
will be given below. However, it is important to realize that this lack of
pension funding does not in itself imply that private pensions reduce
aggregate saving even if employees reduce their own saving by the value of
the expected future benefits. If the capital market operates with full infor-
mation and if shareholders adjust their saving to keep their own alth
unchanged, the reduced saving by employees will be fully offset by the
increased saving of firms and shareholders together.
To understand why shareholder saving would just offset the net dissaving
of employees and the pension fund, it is useful to retain the first two
assumptions of the special case discussed above but to change assumption 3
(3a) No funding.Thecompany has no pension fund. The reduction in the
firm's total wages are paid to shareholders as higher dividends.
If the stock market is fully informed, it will recognize that these higher
dividends do not represent a permanent increase in the company's pro-
fitability but only a postponement of employee compensation. The expected
future pension benefits are a liability of the company which should depress
the price of the company's shares by an amount that is equal to the present
value of the future benefits. Since the extra dividend is equal to the reduction286 M.Fe!dstein, Priraie psuious
in current wages and therefore to the present value of future pension benefits,
if shareholders save the entire extra dividend they will maintain their net
worth at its original prepension value. This is exactly what they should want
to do since nothing has happened to change the real opportunities of
shareholders. Note that in saving all of the extra dividends the shareholders
exactly offset the fall in the employees' savings; alternatively, the extra saving
of the shareholders is like fully funding the future pension benefits,16
Although shareholders are undoubtedly aware of their companies' future
pension obligations in a general way, they are unlikely to have any precise
appreciation of the extent of the unfunded obligation. Such pension liabilities
are not reflected in the accounting calculations of corporate balance sheets.
Modern accounting practice only requires companies to indicate as a note in
their annual report the magnitude of unfunded vested obligations; the total
expected unfunded liability need not be reported at all. Vested benefits are
defined as those to which employees are entitled even if they leave the service
of a company; a company's vested obligation thus includes only the actuarial
value of the benefits of current retirees plus the value of the benefits that
current employees would retain if they terminated employment immediately.
Excluded in this calculation of benefit obligations are several components of
the expected benefits that employees have already 'earned' but which have
not yet become vested, including the past service benefits of employees who
are expected to become vested and the increase in future benefits due to past
service that will result from future wage increases and years of service. The
total unfunded expected liability is likely to be substantially larger than the
unfunded vested betefits.
As an indication of the order of magnitude of these obligations, consider
the General Motors Corporation. At the end of 1976, GM had pension funds
of $8.1 billion but the actuarial value of 'vested benefits' exceeded th total
value of pension funds by $3.0 billion. At the same time, total long-term debt
was only $1.1 billion. The $3.0 billion pension obligation was equivalent to
$10.45 per share of common stock or 13 percent of the market value of the
stock at the end of 1976. Moreover, if unvested benefits have an expected
value of only one-half of vested benefits, the unfunded amount rises from
$3.0 billion to more than $8.5 billion; this is equivalent to $30 per share at
38 percent of market value.17
'"This paragraph shows the important way in which an untunded (or partially funded) private
pension plan differs in theory from an unfunded social security program. With informed capital
markets, shareho'ders will be induced by self-interest to save in a way that offsets the
underfunded pensions. The fall in share prices provides the information and incentive to do this.
A corrcsponding offset occurs with social security only if beneficiaries altruistically increase their
bequests; see Barro (1974).
'7The United States Steel Corporation does report both an unfunded liability for vested
benefits and a more inclusive unfunded accrued liability for past service. The former is S4.90
per shaje of 10 percent of the market value while the latter is 814.70 per share at 30 percent.M. Feldsrein, Pro ate pensions 287
Ina recent study, OldfieId (1977) used a model of share price de-
termination and a sample of data on individual firms to measure the effect of
unfunded liabilities on share prices. He concluded that each dollar per share
of unfunded vested liability reduces the share price, by approximately one
dollar. This implies that share prices are depressed by substantially less than
the total unfunded ex'pected future pension benefits.18
There is a different and quite indirect kind of evidence that the market
undervalues a firm's unfunded pension obligations. Every firm now has the
option of funding its pension liability by 'issuing new bonds and using the
proceeds to buy bonds for the firm's pension fund. Although the transaction
would only change 'the form of the firm's obligation from a debt to the
employees to an equal size debt to the bondholders, this accounting' change
would have a substantial tax advantage for the firm: the interest cost
incurred by the firm on its new debt would be tax deductible while the new
interest income received by the pension fund would not be taxed.. hi the,
General Motors example referred to above, the $3 billion of currently
unfunded vested liability could be financed by issuing $3 hillion of'debt; with
a 9 percent interest rate, the annual ta'ç saving would be approximately $135
million, equivalent to a dividend increase of nearly 10 percent. Why do
General Motors and other firms not avail themselves of this opportunity?
One plausible explanation is that th marker would 'recognize the explicit
debt (and depress share prices accordingly) in a way that the implicit 'debt'
to the pension fund is not recognized.
More generally, with the very inadequate information that is available to
shareholders about the value of likely future pension payments, it is most
unlikely that shareholders increase their own saving to offset the full amount
of the unfunded future pension expenditures.
4.Anestimated savings function
The analysis presented in sections 2 and 3 shows that the effect of the
existing private pension program on aggregate private saving depends on the
answers to three questions: First, by how much do covered emplbyees reduce
their nonpension saving per dollar of present value of anticipated future
pension benefits? Second, what fraction of these anticipated future pension
benefits do firms currently fund? And, third, to what extent do shareholders
increase their current savings to offset the unfunded liabilities of their
'8Oldfield's results must be regarded as preliminary because of an error in his estimation
method. In transforming the vartables in an attempt to correct for heteroskedasticity he did not
adjust the Constant term. His estimation equation therefore corresponds to a different theoretical
specification than the one he intended. His actual procedure of deflating by book value is likely
to bias the coefficient of ihe unfunded pension obligation variable towards minus one if it is
truly close to zero. Correcting for this bias reinforces the conclusion that share prices do not
respond fully to unfunded future pension benefits.288
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corporations?At this time we do not have good answers to any of these
three questions. Moreover, none of these questions can be investigated
adequately with the currently available data. It is necessary therefore togo
directly to an analysis of the net effect of pension growth on private saving.
The current section presents evidence based on anaggregate private
savings equation estimated with annual time series data. The specification of
this equation can best be described as an elaboration of the conventional
personal savings equation that is suggested by life-cycle and permanent
income theories of consumption. In the absence of any public or private
pension program, this conventional savings equation could be written:
SPER1=J0+fi1YD1+p2YD1+f33Ru1+p4ç_1, (1)
where SPER is a real personal saving per capita, YD is real disposable
income per capita, RU is the unemployment rate and Wis the realper capita
value of wealth.19 The level of disposable income in the previousyear and
the unemployment rate are included in an attempt to approximateper-
manent income. Additional lagged values of disposable income might be
included but are generally not statistically significant.
In a previous paper [Feldstein (1974)], I extended this specification to
include 'social security wealth' (SSW), defined as the present actuarial value
of the social security benefits which individuals could anticipatebeing eligible
to receive at age 65, as an additional variable.20 Social security wealth
decreases personal saving in a way that is analogous to the effect of
additional ordinary wealth but its effect is more complex because social
security changes retirement behavior and may alter intergenerational trans—
fers.21 Another earlier study also showed that personal saving tends tovary
inversely with corporate retained earnings [Feldstein (1973)]. This implied
tendency of shareholders to take retained earnings into account in deciding
their personal saving is of course consistent with theoretical expectations.
With the addition of social security wealth per capita and corporate retained
earnings per capita, eq. (1) becomes:
SPER,=/30+fljyD+f32yD1 +fl3RU+fl4W1
+fl5SSW+fl6RE. (2)
'9Thisequation is directly analogous to the aggregate consumption functionestimated by
Ando and Modigliani (1963); multiplying both sides by minus one and adding YD, to both sides
converts (1) into the corresponding consumption function.
20The specification used in that study was actually the analogous consumption function; see
the previous footnote.
2These ideas are discussed in Feldstein (1974. 1976a) and more fully in section 1 of Feldstein
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Sinceprivate savings is the sum of personal savings and retained earnings,
eq. (2) implies directly that
SPRIV=/30+f3 YD,+/32YD,1 +/33RU+/14W;
+J35SSW1+(1+f36)RE,, (3)
where SPRI V =SPER+ RE is real per capita private savings.
Although private pensions have not yet been referred to explicitly, they are
already reflected in the saving and disposable income variables. Personal
saving is defined in the national income accounts to include pension saving
and disposable income includes employees' contributions to pension funds. A
useful way to assess the net effect of pension growth on private savings is to
include the annual net pension saving (SPEN) component of personal saving
as an addition to the explanatory variables of eq. (3):
SPRIT' =/3,+/3 YD, +$2YD,1 +I33RU+f34W,_1
+ /35SSW1+ (1 + /36)RE,+ flSPENr (4)
The extreme hypothesis that each dollar of pension saving increases total
private saving by one dollar implies /37= 1;I shall refer to this as the Add-on
Hypothesis. A second special case, which I shall refer to as the Substitution
Hypothesis, is that pension saving has no effect on total private saving, i.e.
/37=0. More generally, the theoretical discussion ofsections 1 and 2 implies
that /37isnot bounded by zero and one but could in principle be negative (if
pensions depress net private saving) or greater than one (if employees do not
reduce their own direct saving while firms and shareholders save more
because of their future liability).
Eq. (4) has been estimated with annual time series data for the period from
1929 to 1974, the most recent year for which the necessary pension data is
available. The sample excludes the wartime years, 1941 through 1946. The
saving, income and retained earnings variables are derived from the recently
revised official national income account estimates. The series are published in
constant 1972 dollars22 and have been divided by the total civilian popu-
lation to obtain per capita variables. The unemployment rate is the average
unemployed percentage of the civilian labor force during the year as reported
in the Economic Report of the President for 1977. The wealth series (W) is
calculated by linking the estimates of household wealth at market value
originally published by Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Evans (1969) for
the period 1929 to 1951 with estimates for the more recent period that are
developed using the same definitions for the MIT—Penn--SSRC econometric
22SeeSur,eofCi,r,e,,i Business. January 1976.290 M.Feldstein, Private pensions
model; this series is converted to constant 1972 dollars by deflating with the
consumer price index. The social security variable (SSW) is an estimate of
the present actuarial value of the future benefits for which current workers
and retirees would eventually be eligible; the method of constructing this
variable is described in Feldstein (1974).23 The retained earnings variable is
estimated by the Department of Commerce to be net of economic depre-
ciation at replacement cost and adjusted for inventory valuation profits.24
Pension saving (SPEN) is measured as the increase in the book value of
pension fund reserves during the calendar year; this is equivalent to the
contributions of employers and employees plus investment earnings (exclud-
ing capital gains) minus the sum of benefits and the costs of operating the
pensions (including the charges of pension fund managers, insurance com-
panies, etc.).25 These pension values are also adjusted to real dollars with the
consumer price index and converted to per capita amounts.
The parameter estimates for eq. (4) are presented in table 1 as eq. (1.1).
The coefficient of the pension saving variable is positive but it is only a small
fraction of its standard error. It is clearly not possible to reject the
Substitution Hypothesis (f3=O) that private pensions have no effect on total
private saving. The large standard error should also serve as a warning that
this negative finding should not be interpreted as implying strong evidence
that pensions have little effect on private saving; although the coefficient is
small, the large standard error implies that the data are also consistent with
a rather wide range of possible effects on private saving. The full Add-on
Hypothesis ($7 =1) can however be unambiguously rejected. Eq. (1.2) shows
that dropping the insignificant unemployment rate variable does not affect
the finding that the coefficient of the pension saving variable is small and
very much less than its standard error.
Private pensions were a relatively unimportant feature of the American
economy during the years before World War II. As late as 1945 there were
only 6.4 million employees covered by private pension plans; in the next
thirty years, the coverage increased five-fold and the real value of pension
reserves increased by a factor of twelve. It might well be argued that the
response of savings to pensions in the postwar period may therefore be quite
different and, at least, deserves separate analysis. The specification of eq. (1.1)
23The particular variable used in this paper corresponds to GSSW32, i.e. gross social security
wealth estimated on the assumption of 2 percent growth and a 3 percent discount rate for future
real benefits.
24This is a significant improvement over the retained earnings estimates that were available
before the recent revision of the national income accounts. Depreciation was then based on tax
depreciation' and therefore reflected historic costs and artificial depreciation schedules.
In 1974, contributions were $25.0 billion and benefit payments were $12.9 billion. The
increase in book value of $11.5 billion fell short of the difference between contributions and
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isrepeated for the period 1947 through 1974 in eq. (1.3). The coefficient of
SPEN is now substantially larger although still smaller than its standard
error. This remains true when the unemployment rate is omitted in eq. (1.4).
5. Conclusion
The analysis and statistical estimates presented in this paper point to an
important difference in the aggregate economic impact of private pension
programs and unfunded public social security programs. Although such
public social security programs are likely to reduce national savings by
acting as a substitute for household retirement saving, this tendency is offset
in private pension programs by the combination of the companies' partial
funding and the shareholders' response to unfunded liabilities. Of course,
neither effect is theoretically unambiguous. The adverse savings effect of
social security can be offset by induced retirement, changes in intergene-
rational transfers, etc. And private pensions could in principle decrease
aggregate saving if covered employees reduce their other saving by more
than the sum of pension funded accumulation and the induced extra saving
of shareholders. These theoretical ambiguities emphasize the need for empiri-
cal research. Several earlier studies implied that social security does depress
private saving. In contrast, the current paper indicates that the growth of
private pensions has not had an adverse effect on saving and may have
increased saving by a small amount.
It is important to emphasize that the parameter estimates presented in this
paper should be regarded as only a first attempt to answer an important
question. This work can usefully be extended in a number of directions. It
would, for example, be worthwhile to study alternative measures of pension
saving or expected pension benefits.26 A measure of private pension 'wealth'
analogous to the social security wealth variable also deserves consideration.
The changes in retirement behavior during the past 30 years suggest analyzing
the interaction between pensions and retirement as determinants of saving. It
would of course be even better to develop research that looks behind net
savings to the separate effects of pension growth on employee saving, pension
fund accumulation, share prices and shareholder saving.
The recent legislative changes in the pension field are likely to increase the
growth of private pensions and the fraction of pension obligations that are
funded. The impact of these developments on aggregate saving deserves
careful analysis.
250ne preliminary attempt to include a measure of expected pension benefits resulted in
generally insignificant and implausibly large positive parameter estimates.,\ I Feldstein. Priuntc'pensIons 293
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